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AVOIDABLE PITFALLS
AVOIDABLE PITFALLS
IN PURSUIT OF EQUAL PROTECTION
In its role as enunciator of the supreme law of the land, the United
States Supreme Court through legal interpretation has played an active
part in making new law and public policy. This is so because the Court
is composed of persons who reflect society's ever changing economic,
social, and legal patterns. One area in which judicial interpretation has
shaped new law is that of the Court's extension of fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection guarantees to prohibit arbitrary gender-based
discrimination.
Adhering to Supreme Court decisions, state and lower federal courts
have ruled that various penal statutes fail to meet constitutional stan-
dards and must be judicially invalidated. Often the consequences of
such a decision go beyond mere rectification of an invalid statute in an
isolated situation and reach out and embrace the unsavory results of
allowing convicted offenders to go free and having no sanctions for
future offenders. The results flowing from the state supreme court's
decision in Tatro v. State,' which invalidated the so-called "fondling
statute,"-2 exemplifies this quandary. The reasoning of both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions offers a study of the ways in which courts,
while seeking to correct constitutional infirmities, can bring about
equally unsatisfactory decisional by-products. This comment will at-
tempt to give not only a broad overview of the decisions regarding
gender-based discrimination, but also will attempt to offer alternatives
to wholesale statutory invalidation.
'372 So. 2d 283 (Miss. 1979).
'MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-23 (1972).
Any male person above the age of eighteen years who, for the purpose of
gratifying his lust, or indulging his depraved licentious sexual desires, shall han-
dle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his body or any member thereof, any
child under the age of fourteen years, with or without his consent, shall be guilty
of a high crime and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in any sum not less
than ten dollars ($10.00), nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or be
imprisoned in the state penitentiary not less than one year nor more than ten (10)
years, or be punished by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of
the court. [Emphasis added.]
The 1980 legislature amended § 97-5-23 as follows:
Any person above the age of eighteen (18) years, who, for the purpose of
gratifying his or her lust, or indulging his or her depraved licentious sexual de-
sires, shall handle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his or her body or any
member thereof, any child under the age of fourteen (14) years, with or without
the child's consent, shall be guilty of a high crime and upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined in a sum not less than Ten Dollars ($10.00) nor more than One
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or be imprisoned in the state penitentiary not less
than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years, or be punished by both such fine
and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. [Emphasis added.]
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The Tatro Decision
Gary Tatro was tried and sentenced for fondling a ten-year-old fe-
male victim. He appealed the conviction, and on May 30, 1979, one
year later, the conviction was reversed by the Mississippi Supreme
Court and he was discharged. The state was left without sanctions to
impose for violations of the statute after the law was declared uncon-
stitutional.
The court based its decision for reversal on the constitutionality of
the statute. On its face the statute applied only to offenses committed
by "any male person" above eighteen years, and not to "any person"
without regard to gender.3 The court agreed that the exclusive statu-
tory classification of males was under the purview of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution,4 and that based upon
the recent United States Supreme Court treatment of constitutional
challenges of gender-based statutes,' section 97-5-23 denied equal pro-
tection of the law to males and was "clearly" discriminatory." In arriv-
ing at this decision, the court took cognizance of a recent Supreme
Court decision,7 state judicial proceedings in regard to criminal statutes
that followed," and society's changing perception of the role of women
since the original enactment of the statute.9 After declaring the statute
unconstitutional, Justice Smith, writing for the majority, stated that the
statute was void, and that without legislative sanction, the judicial
branch could not rectify the under-inclusiveness by creating a crime
by construction." In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sugg never ques-
tioned the majority's rationale in declaring the statute unconstitutional;
instead he contended that there was an alternative to declaring the
statute void, allowing Tatro's conviction to be overturned, and his acts
to go unpunished."
The court placed its greatest weight of authority for reversal on the
1979 Supreme Court decision in Orr v. Orr, where it was held that
Alabama's alimony statute which imposed support obligations on for-
mer husbands, but not wives, violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' The court proclaimed, by analogizing the
classification of gender to that of race, that a state law which placed a
burden upon men but not on similarly situated women, could be chal-
'372 So. 2d 283.
"'No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
'Orr v. Orr., 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
'372 So. 2d at 285.
'Id. at 283-84 (citing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268).
'ld. at 284 (citing People v. Yocum, 311 I11. App. 3d 586, 35 N.E.2d 183 (1975)).
11d. at 285.
'
0ld. at 284-85.
"ld. at 285 (Sugg, J., dissenting).
"436 U.S. 924.
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lenged in the same manner as statutes which imposed burdens upon
blacks but not whites."8 Alabama's gender-based statute was then found
to be under-inclusive and thus discriminatory, based upon the ratio-
nale and standards set out in prior Supreme Court decisions.' The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court said that " '[t]o withstand scrutiny' under the
equal protection clause, 'classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives.' ""s Applying this standard with the Orr ra-
tionale-that burdens cannot be placed unequally upon persons be-
cause of sex in similar situations-the court announced that section 97-
5-23 could not remain effective law within the bounds of the four-
teenth amendment.1
6
The fondling statute first appeared among Mississippi's laws in
1920.17 The legislative history shows that the act was "intended to be
cumulative and an additional statute for the better protection of fe-
male children against lustful male persons."18 Notice was taken by the
court in Tatro, that at the time of promulgation of the statute, the
notions of sex and women were much different than those observed
today. The legislature in 1920 specifically excluded females from the
class of "lustful persons," for the very reason that they believed that
females were incapable of such acts.'9 Although ideas concerning
women's sexual pursuits have changed since the statute was enacted,
the statute itself has remained virtually unchanged. In 1958 an amend-
ment added male children as potential victims.20
Based upon testimony by an expert witness and common knowl-
edge, the court decided that females were as capable of performing
the prohibited physical acts of the "fondling statute" as any male.21
Therefore the 1920 legislative limitation would, without question, no
longer be realistic.
In Green v. State,22 the Supreme Court of Mississippi rejected an
identical fourteenth amendment challenge to the so-called "peeping
Tom" statute" which was alleged to single out males for punishment.2
"Id. at 1108.
"See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
"372 So. 2d at 283-84 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
"372 So. 2d at 285.
"Hemmingway's Code § 1142(c) (Supp. 1921).
"Id. at § 1142(d).
"372 So. 2d at 285.
"Miss. Laws ch. 276 (1958).
"372 So. 2d at 284.
"270 So. 2d 695 (Miss. 1972).
"Miss. CODE ANN. § 2412.5 (Supp. 1958) (superceded by Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61
(1972)).
"270 So. 2d at 696. See also Brown v. State, 244 Miss. 78, 140 So. 2d 565 (1962).
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The court decided there was a rational basis for singling males out in
such a situation. The court stated that one reason the "peeping Tom"
statute was adopted was to prevent an opportunity for plotting further
deviate sex crimes, especially rape. Rape as defined by statute could be
committed only by a male person.2" Thus based upon the physical and
psychological differences between the genders, the court found that
the sex classification in the statute was not invidious and violative of
the fourteenth amendment." The 1979 court felt that the same justifi-
cations could not be applied to the "fondling statute" primarily be-
cause of a psychiatrist's testimony "that a woman could be just as
guilty of this offense as a man. '"27
Sex Discrimination and the Courts
An understanding of the rationale applied in Tatro can best be
grasped by reviewing the body of Supreme Court holdings on sex dis-
crimination and their subsequent effects on state court decisions. The
application of gender as an effectively applied classification under the
fourteenth amendment was unknown until the 1970's and the Supreme
Court decision of Reed v. Reed.28 The evolutionary trend leading to
the decision can be traced with the corresponding recognition of wom-
en as property owners," voters," workers, 3 1 and business and political
leaders.
When the fourteenth amendment was passed in 1868 its primary
purpose was the establishment of full rights to the recently emancipat-
ed blacks.2 The amendment's future profound effects upon other
classes of persons through judicial interpretation were quite unantici-
pated. As plainly read, the amendment provided for judicial supervi-
sion and limitation of the police powers of the states by preventing a
state from discriminating between its own citizens.3 However, the Su-
preme Court applied the power only to a limited class. In 1872 the
Supreme Court stated that it doubted that any class other than the
"See Lang v. State, 230 Miss. 147, 87 So. 2d 265 (1956) (necessary element of penetra-
tion).
n270 So. 2d at 697.
'"372 So. 2d at 284.
n404 U.S. 71.
"See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-3-1 to 5 (1972).
"U.S. CNsT. amend. XIX.
"See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970); Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
"See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
" All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Negro race would ever come within the sanctions of the fourteenth
amendment.3" But, in the years to come, as social and economic prob-
lems became more complex, the Court was faced with a multitude of
denials of equal protection and eventually extended the benefit of the
amendment to classifications based on other races,35 alienage, 6 illegit-
imacy,37 and gender.3"
It was well over a century after the passage of the fourteenth
amendment that gender was manifested as a classification. However,
the first case heard by the highest court based on the constitutionality
of different treatment of gender,3 9 came shortly after the adoption of
the amendment. The case involved a woman lawyer who possessed all
the requisite qualifications but was refused admission to a state bar
solely because of her sex. The Supreme Court upheld the state court's
decision that the refusal was justified since women were incompetent
to fully perform the duties of an attorney. Mr. justice Bradley based
his concurring opinion on the fact that the common law placed an
inability on married women to make a binding contract separate from
their husbands.4" He dismissed the controversy stating that in his con-
sideration, discrimination based on sex was mandated by the "law of
the creator."" Two years later a woman attempted to attack a state's
denial of her right of suffrage as a privilege of citizenship under the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court upheld the Missouri Con-
stitution and declared that states could constitutionally confer the right
of suffrage upon men only.
2
A precedent for gender-based challenges of various regulatory stat-
utes was set in 1908. In Muller v. Oregon4 3 a state statute limiting
work hours of women but not of men was attacked. The statute was
upheld on the rationale that the physical characteristics of women de-
manded a need for special care and presented no infringement of
fourteenth amendment rights." This was among the first of a number
of so-called "protective statutes" upheld because of biological or ana-
tomical limitations of women.'5
uSlaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
"Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
'"Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
"Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71.
"Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA,
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 609 (1978).
4083 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
41/d.
"Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875). Overruled in 1920 by U.S.
CONS'T. amend. XIX which states that "Itihe right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
"208 U.S. 412 (1908).
"Id. at 421-23.
"See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (statute which allowed women absolute ex-
emption from jury service was held not to be an arbitrary exclusion); Geosaert v. Cleary,
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In 1923 shortly after ratification of the nineteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court invalidated a statute and held that women should not
be treated differently from men in an economic setting, specifically
the setting of minimum wage." The Court noted the changes in con-
tractual, political, and civil status of women, and stated that with the
exception of physical differences, the distinctions between males and
females had almost reached a "vanishing point."' 7 However, in 1937
the Court overruled the 1923 decision and upheld a minimum wage
statute for women only."8 Analysis of the "protective statute" decisions
shows that the Court never treated the rights inhibited by the
discriminating statutes as fundamental, or decided that gender could
possibly be a suspect class. Rather, the statutes were evaluated from
the standpoint of substantive due process of economic regulations. Stat-
utes that treated the sexes differently, but favored women were gener-
ally upheld.'9
A distinct turning point in the adjudication of gender-based statutes
can be seen during the 1970's. By far, the most forceful precedent was
set forth in Reed. It was this 1971 decision that treated gender as a
"classification" within the meaning of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. This placement made gender subject to
scrutiny under judicially created tests. A piece of legislation arbitrarily
providing dissimilar treatment for similarly situated men and women
without regard to individual qualifications, would be struck down as a
violation of the equal protection clause, if it could not sustain the re-
quirements of the so-called rational basis test. Under this test, the clas-
sification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground for difference having a fair and substantial relation to the ob-
ject of the legislation so that all persons similarly situated are treated
alike.5" Reed recognized the principle that the fourteenth amendment
does not deny states the power to treat classes of persons differently as
long as the classification withstands this test.5" Applying these princi-
ples the Reed court struck down a state statute giving males preferen-
tial standing as administrators of a deceased relative's estate without
355 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute was upheld that prevented women from holding bartending
licensing unless they were the wife or the daughter of a male owner); State v. Hall, 187
So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1966) (wherein a state statute was upheld which excluded women from
jury service in order to protect them from the "filth, obscenity, and noxious atmosphere
that so often pervades a courtroom," and to allow them to "continue their service as
mothers, wives, and homemakers." Id. at 863). Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968).
"Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
"Id. at 553.
"West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
"J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 39, at 608 (1978).1 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Originally, the rational
basis test was set out to measure equality for races.
11404 U.S. at 75-76.
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resolving any issue on the merits of qualifications of any applicant.
The reasons for adopting the statute were to cut down on the adminis-
trative procedures of the probate courts and to reduce intra-family
wrangling. Applying the rational basis test the Court found the classifi-
cation to be unreasonable.5 2
Congress entered the sex discrimination arena by adopting several
acts designed to eliminate discrimination based on sex. The Equal Pay
Act (1963)," s and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964),11 were passed
to regulate discriminatory practices in the job market. Shortly before
hearing Reed, the Court heard its first Title VII gender discrimination
case, Phillips v. Martin Marrieta Corp.5 In Phillips, the Court held
that the Act would not allow separate hiring policies for men and
women. Thus, the fact that an employer hired fathers, but not mothers
of pre-school children, violated its provisions. The Court said that the
hiring limitation was in no way related to necessary occupational
qualifications and therefore was discriminatory.56 Subsequent conten-
tions of sex discrimination relating to employment policies have been
raised under Title VII and the Constitution.57
In 1973, the Reed holding was reiterated and amplified in
Frontlero v. Richardson.5" The petitioner, a married female member
of the United States Air Force, challenged the constitutionality of a
federal statute which entitled men, but not women, to the benefit of
uId. at 76-77.
-129 U.S.C. § 206 (1970) (prohibits discrimination on account of sex in the payment of
wages to employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce).
M42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) (prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual's
race, religion, national origin or sex in hiring, firing, and all terms and conditions of
employment).
u400 U.S. 542 (1971).
"Id. at 544.
"See, e.g., Personal Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (absolute lifetime
preference to "veterans" does not discriminate against women in violation of the four-
teenth amendment where act is neutral on its face); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979) (former congressional employee could bring suit against her former employer for
damages when he discharged her on the basis of sex in violation of the Constitution);
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (pregnant women employees cannot be
stripped of accumulated seniority under authority of an under-inclusive plan violative of
Title VII); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of provisions in
disability plan which denied benefits arising from pregnancy was not unconstitutionally
gender-based on its face); Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44
(1975) (pregnant women who against their will were denied work were denied constitu-
tional rights when unemployment compensation was denied); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974) (state disability insurance program excluding benefits for disability from
a normal pregnancy was neutral on its face and not violative of Constitution); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 441 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory requirement that pregnant
school teachers take unpaid maternity leave at arbitrary stage in pregnancy was uncon-
stitutional).
u411 U.S. 677 (1973). This case is noted for its discussion about the previous status of
women in society concluding that " 'romantic paternalism' ... , in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Id. at 684.
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claiming their spouses as dependents, thus qualifying them for various
fringe benefits offered by the military. 9 In the eight-to-one decision,
the majority of the justices agreed that based on the rationale of Reed,
the statute was unconstitutional. However, only four justices agreed to
alter Reed and rank gender as an "inherently suspect" classification
entitled to close judicial scrutiny, as opposed to the less severe limita-
tions of the traditional rational basis test."' A fifth concurring justice
believed that the Court was acting prematurely and that the outcome
of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment should determine the classi-
fication of sex as a suspect class.6
Standing to challenge the constitutionality of gender-based statutes
has not been limited to females. Men as well as women have sought
relief based on the contention. Only a year after the Reed decision, the
Court was faced with deciding the constitutional fate of a statute
which gave preference to females over similarly situated males. Under
the statutory scheme presented for review in Stanley v. Illinois,2 an
unwed father was presumed unfit as a parent, and upon the death of
the mother the children were placed in the guardianship of the state.
A father was denied custody of his children without an actual determi-
nation of the father's parental fitness. The same statute required that
in cases involving unmarried mothers and divorced parents, a hearing
would determine custody. 3 Stanley argued that he was being denied
equal protection of the law by arbitrary discrimination. In the final
analysis, the Court avoided the allegation of unequal protection and
based their decision in favor of the father on due process. The Court
declared that Stanley was constitutionally entitled to a hearing to de-
termine his fitness before being denied custody of his children." De-
spite its controlling rationale, Stanley has consistently been cited in
sex-based equal protection contentions before the Supreme Court.
Up until 1974 statutes in which women received preferential treat-
ment had not been challenged, but such attacks were attemped in
Kahn v. Shevin" and Schlesinger v. Ballard.6 6 Kahn, a widower, al-
leged that a Florida statute which granted widows an annual $500
property tax exemption, but denied widowers the same treatment, de-
nied him of equal protection.6 7 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, declared that the differential treatment met the Reed rational
basis test because the statute was designed "to further the state policy
S91d. at 679-80.
'OId. at 682.
"I1d. at 692.
0405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Uld. at 650.
"Id. at 657-58.
-416 U.S. 351 (1974).
"419 U.S. 498 (1975).
0416 U.S. at 352.
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of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for
which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."" Fron-
tiero was distinguished since the object of the gender preference did
not rest on administrative convenience, but was to reduce the impact
of economic disparity between the sexes.
69
Ballard placed before the Court the differential treatment in the
United States Navy's promotion and discharge regulations. In a five-to-
four decision, the Court held that it was not a denial of equal protec-
tion to subject a male officer to mandatory discharge after nine years
without a promotion, when females were not subject to mandatory dis-
charge for lack of promotion until thirteen years of service."0 The
Court pointed out that the different treatment, unlike that in
Frontiero and Reed, did not reflect "overbroad generalizations" but
was based upon the fact that males and females in the Navy were not
similarly situated. Female officers were restricted from many aspects
of the service such as sea duty and combat missions which normally
allowed male officers a better opportunity for advancement.7'
It was not entirely clear whether men could present a denial of
equal protection contention that would be sustained by the Court.
Women were allowed to strike down discriminatory classifications, but
yet the Court retained a tendency to preserve laws which favored
them. Finally, an affirmative decision was rendered in favor of a male
in Taylor v. Louisiana."'
Taylor, a convicted male, was held to have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the Louisiana jury selection system after being
tried before a jury selected from a venire without women.7" Taylor
alleged that the statute violated sixth and fourteenth amendment guar-
antees by giving women automatic exemptions from jury service unless
they had previously filed a declaration stating their wish to serve. He
contended that the distinction was based solely on sex and denied a
defendant his right to being tried before a jury representing a fair
cross section of the community.7" Although the statute did not disquali-
fy women from jury service, it operated to virtually eliminate them.7"
The Court agreed with the constitutional contentions and struck down
the statute.76
Shortly after Taylor, the Court announced the first of a series of
decisions invalidating Social Security provisions which based the grant
UId. at 355.
Old.
7419 U.S. at 506.
'lid. at 508.
T419 U.S. 522 (1975).
'ld. at 524.
"Id. at 525-26.
"Id. at 525.
"Id. at 531.
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of benefits on sex." In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld," a widower with an
infant son successfully challenged a provision which denied him sur-
vivor benefits after his wife's death during childbirth where she
had been the principal wage earner in the family. 9 The provision
would have allowed benefits to the surviving mother.8" The situation
was distinguished from Ballard because the statute was determined to
be a broad generalization comparable to the statute in Frontiero.81 The
gender-based distinction was unanimously held as irrational and un-
constitutional. However, it is to be noted that even though a male re-
ceived benefits from the ruling, the Court spoke of the statute's result-
ing inequality to women.82
The decisions that followed announced that the Court was in fact
willing to require the use of the same standards for men. In the 1975
decision of Stanton v. Stanton,83 Mr. Justice Blackmun speaking for
the Court, declared that an age-sex differential in a child support stat-
ute was not based upon any rational objective, and thus could not
withstand the judicial scrutiny required in testing its constitutionality.8"
The unconstitutional statute required that a divorced parent with cus-
tody receive support payments for male children until they reached
the age of twenty-one, but for female children only until age eigh-
teen. 5
A subsequent case likewise invalidated a statute involving age-sex
differentials. Craig v. Boren"8 in 1976, invalidated a statute which pro-
hibited the sale of beer to males under the age of twenty-one and fe-
males under age eighteen. The unequal treatment resulting for males
eighteen to twenty-one could not withstand the scrutiny demanded by
the then long line of gender-based cases.8" The Court was offered a
"Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(wherein provisions providing that O.S.D.I. benefits were to be paid to widows regard-
less of dependency, but paid to widowers only if they received fifty percent of their
support from their late wives, was declared unconstitutional). Cf. Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313 (provisions allowing women to disregard low-earning years of employment
from 1956-1962 from the calculation of their retirements were upheld, described as an
enactment to compensate women for past discrimination.)
s420 U.S. 636 (1975).
'
9id. at 639.
1 ld. at 640.
"Id. at 643.
"Id. at 645. Since the Constitution forbids the gender-based differentiation premised
upon assumptions as to dependency made in the statutes before us in Frontiero the
Constitution also forbids the gender-based differentiation that results in the efforts of
female workers required to pay social security taxes producing less protection for their
families than is produced by the efforts of men. Id.
"421 U.S. 7 (1975).
"Id. at 17.
"Id. at 9.
"429 U.S. 190 (1976).
"I1d. at 198.
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barrage of statistics by the state in an attempt to prove that traffic
safety provided the requisite governmental objective to meet the ra-
tional basis test. The Court, however, deemed the statistics inad-
equate." Concurring, Mr. Justice Stevens admitted that the classifica-
tion was not as offensive as many others, since men generally, unlike
women, have not been subjected to historical discrimination. He none-
theless said that the classification was "objectionable" because it was
based on an "accident of birth."9
The 1979 decisions of Orr v. Or?' and Caban v. Mohammed1 di-
rectly attacked the under-inclusiveness of statutes which favored fe-
males but placed a greater burden upon males. Caban like Orr in-
volved a domestic relations controversy. Under the New York adoption
statutes, a father of illegitimate children could not adopt his natural
children if the natural mother did not consent. The father, however,
could not prevent adoption of his children by their natural mother and
her spouse by refusing his consent. The natural father had the addi-
tional burden of proving to the presiding judge that the pending adop-
tion would not be in the best interests of the children. 2 The Court
found the difference between unmarried parents bore no substantial
relation to the object of the statute which was to provide the best possi-
ble adoptive homes for the illegitimate children. The Court noted
that in situations where the unwed father had not recognized the
child, nothing in the equal protection clause would prevent the state
from making distinctions and denying him the right to come forward
to halt adoptive proceedings.9
In summary, the holdings in the previously discussed cases have
merely extended the traditional fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion guarantee to include similarly situated women. When substantiat-
ed evidence can prove that the classes are in fact dissimilar under the
circumstances, the government is allowed to make distinctions that fol-
low some legitimate end. The tests used to make distinctions between
classifications are not based on absolute differences. If so, the mere fact
that biological differences exist between men and women would allow
all gender-based statutes to stand. The true test is whether persons simi-
larly situated should be given dissimilar treatment in order to achieve
"Id. at 204.
"Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90440 U.S. 268 (1979).
'1441 U.S. 380 (1979).
"Id. at 385.
"Id. at 391. But see Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (a statute which allowed
only fathers of legitimate children to bring suit for wrongful death of the child, but
which also allowed mothers of illegitimate children, was held not to be invidiously dis-
criminatory against the male sex. The mother and father were not similarly situated.)
"441 U.S. at 391-92.
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the purpose of the legislation.95 Hence, gender may not be used as a
determinant for choosing an administrator of an estate,96 as a presump-
tion of dependency," as a presumption of fitness as a parent,9" for ser-
vice as a juror,99 to determine ability to claim survivor's benefits, 00 to
determine certain civil'1 and criminal liabilities,' and for punishment
for child molestation." 3 Laws using sex solely as a determinant with no
legitimate purpose are classified as under-inclusive. Under-inclusive leg-
islation hypothetically could reach all persons similarly situated, but in
operation actually places a benefit or burden upon the excluded group,
or as in Tatro, the excluded gender.' An under-inclusive statute cannot
stand under the scrutiny necessitated by the equal protection guarantee
of the Constitution.
A problem area resulting from Supreme Court decisions is the vary-
ing standards of court developed tests to be applied to gender classifi-
cations to determine their constitutionality." 5 Mr. Justice Powell, con-
curring in Craig, admittedly recognized this fact when he stated, "As
is evident from our opinions the Court has had difficulty in agreeing
upon a standard of equal protection analysis that can be applied con-
sistently to the whole variety of legislative classifications. "0 The Court
has yet to specify if gender is merely a "classification" to be tested
under the minimum rational basis test, or if gender has risen to such a
degree of distinction that it becomes a "suspect classification," thus
being subject to strict scrutiny or two-tier test to determine if the law
is invidious. To confuse matters even more, Mr. Justice Powell con-
tends that the Court has philosophically adopted a third "middle tier
approach," to apply specially to gender-based statutes. He suggests this
approach consists of a "subdivision" of equal protection analysis which
allows a stricter view than the rational basis test, but not as critical of a
review as is necessitated by strict scrutiny." 7 The effect of the lack of a
uniform standard has been that lower courts have applied different
standards in deciding the constitutional fate of the statutes.) 8 The
Mississippi Supreme Court, in Tatro, did not specifically articulate
11j. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 39, at 520.
"Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71.
"Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677.
"Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645.
"Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522.
'Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636.
'Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7.
,Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190.
'
08Tatro v. State, 372 So. 2d 283.
'"See note 112, infra.
'"Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (rational basis test). But see Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 682 (strict scrutiny test).
'"429 U.S. at 210 n. ° .
'01d.
'"See Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 604 (lst Cir. 1977) (applied strict scrutiny
test after giving basis for rejecting rational basis test); People v. McKellar, 146 Cal. Rptr.
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the standard it chose to use. The court quoted Califano v. Webster,1"
which applied the rational basis test. However, in citing the Illinois
decision of People v. Yocum,"' the court suggests that gender is a "sus-
pect classification" at least in regard to criminal statutes."'
Criminal Statutes Under Scrutiny
Most criminal statutes adopted by the State of Mississippi hold both
sexes equally accountable for sanctioned acts prescribed.' However, a
small minority, generally those involving sexual acts, provide that the
act can be perpetrated against only one sex,"' or apply sanctions to
only one sex.' The criminal statutes that nationally have come under
the harshest attacks as discriminatory have been the rape statutes that
make gender-based distinctions.' However, with one exception,"" the
attacks have consistently been rejected, the statute upheld, and the
convictions allowed to stand. Various courts have felt that although it
is possible for females to commit the offense, historically it has in fact
been committed by males against females."7 Furthermore, courts have
consistently found that in instances of rape, the nonapplicability to fe-
males is rational and not arbitrary. Courts rely on the principle that
the fourteenth amendment does not deny states the power to treat dif-
ferent classes of persons in different ways so long as the classification is
reasonable."' Courts have also considered the interests of both the state
and the individual rape victim."9
327, 330 (1978) (applied rational basis test after weighing factors of application of strict
scrutiny test).
109430 U.S. 313 (1977).
"311 Ill. App. 3d 586, 335 N.E.2d 183 (1975).
"'372 So. 2d at 284.
"'See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 (Supp. 1979) (assault and aggravated as-
sault--"a person"); § 97-3-21 (Supp. 1979) (homicide-"every person"); § 97-3-51
(1972) (kidnapping-"every person").
"'See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1979) (carnal knowledge of child under
twelve years-"a female child"); § 97-3-71 (1972) (rape-"any female"); § 97-29-55
(1972) (seduction-"any woman.., or female child"); § 97-35-11 (1972) (abusive lan-
guage or indecent exposure-"in the presence or hearing of... any female"); § 97-3-1
(1972) (abduction-"take any female").
.. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-67 (1972) (statutory rape--"any male person"); §
97-29-61 (1972) (voyeurism or "peeping Tom" statute--"any male person"); § 97-11-13
(1972) (penalty for acceptance of bribe by any officer, agent, trustee-"or if his
wife.., shall accept...").
1"See, e.g., Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977); Ex parte Graves, 571
S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1978); Hall v. State, 365 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. 1978); State v. .Giles, 34
N.C. App. 112, 237 S.E.2d 305 (1977); Stewart v. State, 534 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1976);
State v. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d 340 (La. 1976); In re W.E.P., 318 A.2d 286 (D.C. 1974).
"'564 F.2d 602 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1977).
"'Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298, 1303 (6th Cir. 1977).
"'See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
"'See State v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720, 723 (1974).
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Among the factors considered are the prevention of pregnancy,
which males are not faced with, the resulting physical injury that
could only occur to females,' the historical longevity of the crime,"'
and the physiological differences existing between men and women.122
The attitude among courts is perhaps best expressed by a Maryland
justice who said, "The equality of sexes expresses a societal goal not a
physical metamorphosis. It would be anomalous indeed if our aspira-
tions toward the ideal of equality under the law caused us to overlook
our disparate human vulnerabilities. "123
Although rape statutes have been attacked with the most vigor, oth-
er criminal statutes have been challenged for alleged gender-based dis-
crimination. Among them are the Mann Act,124 and various state stat-
utes prohibiting indecent exposure,' sodomy,126 bastardy,2 ' and prosti-
tution.2 Likewise, differential treatment based on gender regarding
criminal procedure2 and the ensuing punishment' 0 after conviction
has been attacked.
Severabilty-A More Reasonable Alternative
When analyzing the statute in Tatro, one cannot deny the
rationality of the holding. Clearly the statute was unconstitutional
based on modern guidelines. However, for the very reason that our
legal system provides a long established "elementary principle"'' for
remedying unconstitutional statutes, one might question the rationality
of completely voiding the statute and discharging a conviction based
solely on the question of the constitutionality of a statute. The Tatro
"'See State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 815, 819 (Me. 1978).
..See Ex parte Graves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 891-92 (Tex. 1978).
"'See People v. McKellar, 146 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329, 81 Cal. App. 3d 367 (1978).
'"Brooks v. State, 24 Md. App. 334, 330 A.2d 670, 673 (1975).
"'18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970). See also United States v. Green, 554 F.2d 372 (9th Cir.
1977) (held constitutional).
'"See Robinson v. State, 253 Ark. 882, 489 S.W.2d 503 (1973) (held constitutional,
though applied only to women for appearing bare from waist up).
"'See United States v. Cozart, 321 A.2d 342 (D.C. 1974).
'"See Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 368 Mass. 613, 334 N.E.2d 613 (1975) (held un-
constitutional, father but not mother was guilty of misdemeanor for conceiving out of
wedlock).
'"See Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471, 306 N.E.2d 95 (1974) (held constitutional,
though only applied to women). But see Commonwealth v. King, ...-- Mass. -, 372
N.E.2d 196 (1977) (statute held constitutional, though enforced solely against females).
'"See, e.g., Lamb v. Brown, 425 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972) (held unconstitutional, age-
sex differential treatment as to the nature of trial proceedings, juvenile or adult).
See, e.g., People v. Malone, 38 Ill. App. 3d 157, 347 N.E.2d 862 (1976) (constitution-
ality of a statute upheld which classified a father's abuse of the father-daughter relation-
ship as aggravated incest, and designated abuse of the mother-daughter relationship as
incest, punishable by a lesser sentence).
"'Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's lessee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 526 (1829). See also Allen
v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80 (1880); Campbell v. Mississippi Union Bank, 7 Miss. (6 How-
ard) 625 (1842).
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majority based its determination on the precedent of Fay v. Noia.82
That decision, also involving a fourteenth amendment violation,
quoted an earlier holding which said, "An unconstitutional law is void,
and is as no law. An offense created by it is not a crime. A conviction
under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be
a legal cause of imprisonment."' 88 This long established- doctrine is
based upon the principle that no authority of the government can re-
strain a citizen contrary to the fundamental law set out in the Consti-
tution.' At first the doctrine would seem totally inconsistent with the
dissent's suggestion in Tatro, that the unconstitutional gender-based
distinction could be removed from the statute by employing the prin-
ciple of severability. Applying the doctrine the word "male" would be
eliminated from the statute and it could be preserved.3 The two prin-
ciples, however, act as alternatives under certain conditions. When a
statute is held defective because of under-inclusiveness, the presiding
court has two remedial choices. It can declare the statute as a whole
void, or it can extend the coverage of the statute to include the ex-
cluded class. The latter alternative applies only when the statute is par-
tially invalid. Whether the valid portion can remain enforceable de-
pends upon further inquiry.
Severability is a principle of judicial statutory construction sup-
ported by a number of precepts of construction including the precepts
that statutes should be construed to remain constitutional whenever
possible, that the legislature did not intend to enact an invalid act, and
that a legislative act should not be declared unconstitutional except for
reasons that are clear and satisfactory."' Justice Sugg in Tatro, recog-
nized severability when he set out the long line of prior Mississippi
decisions to support his contention that the statute could be remedied
through judicial construction. 137
As previously noted the principle of severability has limited applica-
tion. Courts are not left to apply the principle indiscriminately. Judici-
ally created guidelines and self-restraints prevent courts from overstep-
ping their bounds and treading upon purely legislative grounds. Before
severability can be applied it must be found that the legislative will
was that the act was separable. In other words the legislature would
not have passed the act with the invalid parts. In determining this,
courts have looked at such factors as the history of the act, the exis-
tence of an emergency, the object sought by the legislature, and the
context of the act.' 8 After determination of intent, the act must be
182372 U.S. 391 (1963).
'"Id. at 408 (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879)).
"'Id. at 408-09.
"372 So. 2d at 286 (Sugg, J., dissenting).
"'2 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 335-36 (4th ed. 1973).
" 3 72 So. 2d at 285 (Sugg, J., dissenting).
2 C. SANDS, supra note 136, at 338.
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proven to be capable of separate enforcement; that is, the valid portion
independent of the invalid portion forms a complete act within itself
capable of sanctioning behavior.' If parts of a statute are independent
it is presumed that the act was intended to be separable. 4 ' To supple-
ment these tests, courts have applied even more exacting tests. One
such test includes examining the reason for passage of the act. If the
reason included most of the invalid portion of the statute the statute
must fail as a whole.' Another test includes the determination of the
dominant or general legislative purpose of the act. If the purpose can
be preserved apart from the repugnant part, the valid portion can re-
main active. But if the purpose of the act would be altered, the court
is precluded from applying the principle of severability."
Applying the principle of severability to the "fondling statute," one
can easily conclude, as did the dissent, that after the deletion of the
word "male," the statute is valid. To reach such a conclusion requires
looking first at the legislative intent of the act.' The dissenting justices
noted that the 1958 amendment, broadening the class of protected
children to include males, furnished proof that Mississippi lawmakers
were aware of changing sexual mores. However, when the statute was
first enacted and later amended, there was no way for the legislature
to know that in years to come the fourteenth amendment would be
expanded and used as a limitation on enforcement of gender-based
discriminatory criminal statutes. It is reasonable to believe that if
present equal protection construction existed then, undoubtedly the
legislature would have expanded the proscriptions to include female
violators. 4' Furthermore, the overriding purpose of the statute, that is,
protection of children from molestation by deviate adults, cannot be
avoided. This general purpose or operative part of the statute is not so
closely connected or dependent upon the one repugnant word
"male."" 5 These facts coupled with the presumptions that a legislature
would not have intended to pass an invalid act, that a statute is sever-
able, and the supreme court's past liberal use of the principle,"' clearly
make severability applicable to the statute in Tatro. Without the word
'"Id. at 341-42.
"Old. at 352.
"'Id. at 346.
1Id. at 347.
"'See Hemingway's Code §§ 1142(c)-(d) (Supp. 1921).
"'372 So. 2d at 286.
'
5ld. at 285-86.
'See Lovorn v. Hathorn, 365 So. 2d 947, 947-50 (Miss. 1979); O'Neal v. Simpson, 350
So. 2d 998, 1003-04 (Miss. 1977); Wilson v. Jones County Bd. of Supervisors, 342 So. 2d
1293, 1296-98 (Miss. 1977); Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774, 781-82 (Miss. 1974); Spears
v. State, 278 So. 2d 443, 444-46 (Miss. 1973); American Express Co. v. Beer, 107 Miss.
528, 65 So. 575, 578 (1914); Adams v. Standard Oil Co. 97 Miss. 879, 909-10, 53 So. 692,
696-97 (1910); Campbell v. Mississippi Union Bank, 7 Miss. (6 Howard) 625, 677-78
(1842).
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"male" the valid operative portion of the statute would be in effect
gender-neutral. The remaining masculine pronouns would be of no
concern for they would be remedied by the Code itself.147
Of no mandatory judicial consequence to the court, but perhaps of
some import, is the fact that other state and federal courts have suc-
cessfully applied the principle of severability to under-inclusive
gender-based statutes. Other courts have simply through construction
deleted words of female and/or male gender and upheld convictions
under statutes that they simultaneously found violative of equal pro-
tection. 4
If the "fondling statute" had been interpreted broadly to remedy its
under-inclusiveness, the dissenting justices recognized that the judicial
enlargement would be an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied
to females. Thus in order to effect due process, the law could not be
applied retroactively to females. Only after they were put on notice
that they too would be punished with equal force, could females be
held criminally liable for the act of fondling under such an interpreta-
tion. If the statute had been remedied to apply to both sexes, it could
not be said that a male failed to have prior notice of the criminality of
his acts. Thus Tatro would not have been affected in this manner by
such a ruling. 9
The Tatro majority took a very narrow view of legislative intent,
regarding the intentional exclusion of females as applicable today, de-
spite the noted changes in social mores. The majority reasoned that
judicial statutory construction would create a new statute without leg-
islative sanction, an improper court action. s0 The justices evidently
could not distinguish the functions of construction to create from that
of construction to remedy. In a rush to bring state laws in line with the
objectives of the Constitution the majority overlooked the court's pow-
er of construction. The majority certainly departed from the words of
the United States Supreme Court, that "[t]he cardinal statutory princi-
pal of statutory construction is to save, not to destroy."''
It is interesting to note and compare the rejection of the principle of
severability in the instant case with that of cases of equal significance
"'MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-17 (1972). "Words in the masculine gender shall embrace a
female as well as a male, unless a contrary intention may be manifest."
'
4 See, e.g., Ex parte Tullos, 541 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1976). Cf. Moritz v. Commissioner,
469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972) (benefit of tax deduction generally provided, extended to
taxpayer despite invalidity of the challenged provision); Harringfeld v. District Court of
Seventh Judicial Dist., 95 Idaho 540, 511 P.2d 822 (1973) (unconstitutional statute not
nullified in its entirety, but would make eighteen the age of majority for males as well
as females); People v. Ellis, 10 Ill. App. 3d 216, 293 N.E.2d 189 (1973) (minor given
protections of statute on juvenile proceedings, even though portions unconstitutional).
1"372 So. 2d at 287 (Sugg, J., dissenting).
'wId. at 284-85.
...NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1936). See also Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971).
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where the principle has been accepted by the Mississippi Supreme
Court. In 1973, following the United States Supreme Court decisions of
Doe v. Bolton5 2 and Roe v. Wade,"3 the Mississippi Supreme Court
held in Spears v. State' that the state abortion statute was unconstitu-
tional. The court found, however, that the statute was severable and
that a conviction under the remaining valid portion could stand.
In 1974 the state supreme court found the state's controlled sub-
stance law unconstitutional in Howell v. State."'s The appellant-
defendant was then charged under the valid portion of the statute.
Perhaps the Spears and Howell courts were cognizant of the equally
important objectives of protecting unborn children and society on the
one hand and protecting the constitutional rights of abortionists and
drug traffickers on the other.
The ramifications of the Tatro decision were immediate. Only two
months after the court denied Tatro's petition for rehearing"' it was
faced with Catchot v. State,"5 7 an appeal from a conviction under the
"fondling statute." The court declared that Tatro controlled and said it
had "no choice, though reluctantly," but to reverse the case and throw
out the appellant's conviction."' 8 This time the court looked for alterna-
tives rather than just allowing the defendant to go free. Though the
reversal was granted, the court ordered the defendant held for addi-
tional grand jury action on the charge of attempted rape, indecent
exposure, or other possible violations based upon the record. 5 '
Conclusion
It is reasonable to conclude that the court will be faced with numer-
ous similar challenges arising from convictions under existing gender-
based statutes.6 0 Tatro's forceful precedent will perhaps serve as a
springboard for such attempts. An even more ominous result of Tatro
is that those tried and convicted under the "fondling statute" can now
petition the supreme court for release. The only way to correct the
resulting fondling prohibition void is through legislative enactment of
a constitutionally sound fondling statute-an unfortunate necessity.
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court did not envision the im-
11410 U.S. 179 (1973).
1U410 U.S. 113 (1973).
...278 So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1973).
..300 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1974) (violation of the state constitution).
'"Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, Tatro v. State, 372 So. 2d 283 (Miss. 1979).
5374 So. 2d 807 (Miss. 1979). See also Carley v. State, No. 51,658 (Miss. April 30,
1980) (the sole assignment of error was the unconstitutionality of Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-
5-23 (fondling statute), the court held that "unfortunately" the assignment was well tak-
en. However, per Catchot v. State, the court retained the appellant for further action by
the grand jury.)
1'0374 So. 2d at 808.
'Id.
'"See notes 113 and 114, supra.
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pact that its extension of fourteenth amendment protection to classifi-
cations based on sex would have on the nation's criminal processes.
Regardless, the principle has been accepted and implemented by
courts at all levels and will remain a viable safeguard. Because of this
trend Mississippi lawmakers should immediately focus their attention
on adjusting all state laws which classify according to sex to conform
with constitutional standards so that the human and monetary costs
suffered in Tatro and Catchot can be avoided.
Some states have anticipated this type of attack and have amended
their criminal statutes so that all offenses apply to both men and wom-
en."' Other states have enacted a state equal rights amendment which
results in all criminal statutes being applied to both sexes.'
Perhaps the most effective way to resolve the issue would be
through passage of the twenty-seventh or Equal Rights Amendment.""
Adoption of the amendment would mandate that all states repeal and
revise their repugnant gender-based laws. This constitutionally man-
dated national revision would bring about a uniform solution to lurk-
ing constitutional ills and would avoid having courts make ad hoc de-
terminations. With such repeals and revisions accomplished it would
be hoped that courts then would not be forced to "reluctantly" adhere
to their own precedents.
Barbara Bond
"'See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.01 to 893.15; MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.01
to 752.906; WASH. REV. CODE-ANN. §§ 9.01.55 to 9.100.080.
..
2See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 3 (1972); COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 29 (1972); HAW.
CONsT. art. 1, § 3 (1972); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18 (1971); MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 46
(1972); MONT. DEC. OF RIGHTS art. 2, § 4 (1973); N.M. CONST. art 2, § 18 (1973); PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 28 (1971); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3a (1972); WASH. CONST. art 31, § 1
(1972).
16
H.R.J. RES. 208, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). "Equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." Id.
See also Mott, An Analysis of Mississippi's Criminal Law Under the Equal Rights
Amendment, 47 Miss. L. J. 279 (1976).
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